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RESPONSE
RIGHTS AND REALITIES
Laura A. Rosenbury*
M ELISSA Murray's thought-provoking article The Networked
IFamily: Refraining the Legal Understanding of Caregiving
and Caregivers provides a compelling analysis of the limits of
functional approaches to the family. Although these approaches
have been among the most important concepts motivating family
law reforms and scholarship over the past thirty years, Murray
illustrates the many ways in which they have both overlooked the
complexities of childrearing and positioned caregiving as the sole
domain of parents and their functional equivalents. Murray then
begins a process of deconstructing legal notions of caregiving in
order to expose and challenge the choices made by states and
scholars when they assign the rights and responsibilities of
caregiving solely to parents, even broadly defined. Murray
concludes by urging scholars and reformers to spend more time
considering "the question of how families perform their caregiving
work" in order to begin to address the gaps created by a family law
regime that recognizes only parents and strangers in children's
lives.'
Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, lrosenbury@wustl.edu
Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 Va. L. Rev. 385, 454 (2008).
40 Virginia Law Review In Brief [Vol. 94:39
Taking up Murray's call for "others to join this important
conversation,"' I enthusiastically support Murray's project. Her
article is outstanding, and I hope it will spur a fundamental shift in
family law scholarship. Indeed, despite her modesty, Murray has
proposed several alternatives that could radically alter the law's
current view of the parent-child relationship and of family
relationships in general.' I support these proposals to the extent
that they force reformers and scholars to confront who benefits
and who is harmed by legal conceptions of the family, even ones
that have been expanded to reflect functional approaches to the
family. I fear, however, that Murray's analysis may be held back by
an assumption about the appropriate relationship between rights
and reality often embraced by family law scholars including, at
times, by Murray herself.
I. THE Focus ON REALITY
Throughout her article, Murray emphasizes that parents "rely on
a broad network of caregivers-extended family members, friends,
neighbors, and paid caregivers-who assist with caregiving," and
convincingly illustrates the ways that many parents so rely.4 She
simultaneously argues-both explicitly and implicitly-that family
law is defective because it fails to reflect this caregiving continuum,
instead recognizing only legal parents and strangers.! Murray's
identification and assessment of family law's silence about this
caregiving continuum is new and exciting, but not necessarily
surprising. As Murray points out, scholars have long assumed that
an ideal conception of family law should "reflect the reality of
family life."' I have also embraced that assumption in past work,
Id. at 455.
In particular, see id. at 447-54 (discussing the possibilities of "alternative statuses"
and "[d]ismantling the [s]tatus of [p]arent").
Id. at 387; see also, e.g., id. at 390-94, 415-32.
See, e.g., id. at 388 (stating that family law should "better support caregiving as it is
practiced" and calling for "a broader legal understanding of caregiving that would
acknowledge a wider range of caregiving efforts, not simply those performed by
parents or those who function as parents").
' Murray uses this phrase, or versions of it, several times. See, e.g., id. at 389; id. at
394; id. at 438. For examples of other scholars who have embraced the assumption
that family law should reflect the reality of family law, see id. at 435-37 (discussing the
work of scholars who "[t]ak[e] seriously the notion that family law should support the
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but I have recently come to question its usefulness. Murray's article
only reinforces my suspicion.
A focus on reforming family law to "reflect the reality of family
life" assumes there is a reality, or truth,' existing outside of the law
that can be reflected within family law. That assumption embraces
enlightenment thinking, makes family law scholarship
interdisciplinary by legitimizing the use of social science to discover
the "reality" of family life, and permits family law scholars to
employ a straightforward conception of the interplay between law
and society, all of which can be useful. Yet the assumption also
risks oversimplifying family life by focusing on one reality, or
several realities, to the exclusion of other realities or lived
experiences. More importantly, it risks obscuring the many factors
that shape and influence the so-called realities of family life,
including the law. Accordingly, a focus on the "realities" of family
life can quickly naturalize family life, making it appear as if family
life is indeed some identifiable truth existing outside of the law.
Murray implicitly recognizes these risks when she presents the
ways that family law constructs caregiving as parenting for
purposes of legal analysis' and criticizes the effect of that
construction on areas of life outside of the courtroom and
statehouse. For example, Murray argues that scholars must move
away from their focus on parenthood because the law's "inability
to recognize more broadly networks of care is costly for parents,
families, and the nonparental caregivers on whom they rely.""' That
ways in which families operate"); Martha Minow, All in the Family & In All Families:
Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. Va. L. Rev. 275, 287-88 (1992-93); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean by Home": Toward a
Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 569, 576-
84.
7 Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 833, 875-78
(2007) [hereinafter Rosenbury, Between Home and School]; Laura A. Rosenbury,
Friends with Benefits?, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 189, 208-11 (2007) [hereinafter Rosenbury,
Friends with Benefits?].
Murray, supra note 1, at 410 ("The law's failure to acknowledge this truth about
family life creates a disjunction between family law and policy and the reality of
family life on the ground."); see also id. at 438 (calling for "progress towards a more
accurate account of family life").
'Murray, supra note 1, at 394-409.
'0 Id. at 387-88.
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statement, and others like it," reveal that Murray believes that
family law does more than reflect the reality of family life. Instead,
family law can also shape family life, and Murray takes issue with
the costs imposed by the ways family law currently does so.
Murray's argument therefore reveals that caregiving is
constructed-not just for purposes of legal analysis but also more
broadly-as various factors influence the choices and actions of the
parties engaged in care.
Given that caregiving is always a construction, I am highly
skeptical that family law can ever merely reflect reality. I therefore
question the usefulness of Murray's argument that "[a]s a
descriptive matter, expanding our understanding of caregiving
would reconcile family law with the reality of family experience. '"2
But Murray's arguments are not just, or even primarily,
descriptive. Rather, she also makes normative arguments about
why family law should affirmatively address the caregiving
continuum.13 It is to those arguments that I now turn.
II. THE Focus ON RIGHTS
Murray argues that family law should "acknowledge" or
"recognize" networks of care because such state action would
lessen "guilt and anxiety about [parents'] use of nonparental
caregiving," "facilitate and enable parents in providing care,"
clarify understandings of the role of caregiving in society, and "give
dignity to [nonparental] caregivers and their efforts."'4
Interestingly, Murray does not invoke legal rights in this discussion,
instead focusing on legal recognition or acknowledgement without
defining those terms. Such terms could be a vestige of Murray's
descriptive project of conforming family law to family life, but I
read them to mean more. By invoking the language of recognition
and acknowledgment, Murray is emphasizing the signaling or
expressive function of law, once again challenging the notion that
the law can ever merely reflect family life.
'' See, e.g., id. at 405; id. at 434 (emphasizing that recognition or nonrecognition of
caregiving networks is "a choice that affects the ways in which families operate in
providing care").
'Id. at 409.
Id. at 410-15.
4 d. at 411-13.
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I suspect, however, that Murray also has another reason for
focusing on legal acknowledgment and recognition rather than
rights. Legal recognition is a tempting middle ground between the
law's conveyance of rights and the law's silence, a middle ground
that I too have embraced." This middle ground is particularly
attractive in the context of the parent-child relationship because, as
Murray highlights, it can constitute a moderate response to the
question, often posed in shocked outrage, of whether nannies
should receive rights to the children under their care. 6 Questions
like this reveal the blunt nature of rights discourse and the need to
develop more nuanced approaches. Yet Murray's article ultimately
reveals that we cannot avoid discussions of rights in this context,
even if we may want to.
Rights must be on "the table"' at least initially, because legal
parenthood is currently defined as the ability to exercise certain
rights. Murray does not explicitly delineate those rights, but she
highlights the most important one, the right to make decisions on
behalf of the child free from state interference." As before, that
legal construction does not merely reflect the parental role but also
reinforces and, in part, creates it. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a
non-legal conception of parent entirely divorced from the legal
conception of a parent as an individual vested with decisionmaking
authority over a child. Parenthood, like caregiving, is a
construction both within the law and without, and rights currently
play a crucial role in that construction.
Murray insightfully analyzes the ways this rights-based
construction of parent not only benefits legal parents at the
potential expense of nonparental caregivers, but also can harm
legal parents who feel overwhelmed with the demands of expansive
childrearing authority. I hope those of us continuing the
conversation will also examine why legal parents can
simultaneously feel threatened by the thought of extending rights
to the members of the caregiving networks that help them meet
those demands. I suspect the threat centers around a desire to
'Rosenbury, Between Home and School, supra note 7, at 891-93; Rosenbury,
Friends with Benefits?, supra note 7, at 226-29.
" Murray, supra note 1, at 439.
17 Cf. id. at 450 (suggesting taking "the issue of parental rights ... off the table").
" See id. at 395, 450.
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maintain the hierarchy between parents and nonparents that
Murray critiques. In fact, parents may rely on caregiving networks
in part because they know such reliance will not threaten the rights
bestowed on them as legal parents, providing another example of
the ways that family law does not merely reflect family life but also
shapes it.
As such, of the three approaches Murray considers, only the last
one-"dismantling the legal understanding of parenthood
entirely"1 -seems to begin to address and challenge the privileging
of parental care over all other forms of care. The other two
approaches create bigger caregiving in-groups, but such expansion
further obscures the care provided by caregiving out-groups."'
Accordingly, if Murray wants to achieve her normative goals, she
must first take on the issue of parental rights and the reasons for
conferring those rights. As Murray acknowledges, those reasons go
well beyond a desire to reflect the reality of family life, instead
encompassing various attempts to privatize dependency.21 I do not
know the best way to dismantle the current legal understanding of
parenthood or the best construct to replace it. But I look forward
to ongoing conversations about what parenthood could mean in a
legal regime that revolves less around private decisionmaking
authority and more around children and the ways their needs and
desires can be met along various caregiving continuums.
" Id. at 453.
"°Murray acknowledges this dynamic when discussing the first two approaches,
although she uses different terminology. See id. at 446-47, 450.
" See id. at 394-98, 433.
